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THE DOWNSIDE OF JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT: THE (NON-)EFFECT OF
JONES V. HARRIS
JOHN C. COATES IV*

In 1970, Congress added section 36(b) to the Investment
1
Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”). Section 36(b) imposes a fiduciary
duty on investment advisers of mutual funds “with respect to the
2
receipt of compensation” and creates a private right of action to
3
enforce this duty. In Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management,
the Second Circuit outlined what would become the generally
accepted test of whether the adviser fees were in an acceptable range.
Gartenberg set out a number of non-exclusive factors to be
considered: the nature and quality of the services provided; the
profitability to the adviser of providing services to the fund; realized
economies of scale; fee structures of comparable funds; the
4
independence and conscientiousness of trustees; and fall-out benefits.
Recently, the Seventh Circuit specifically disavowed Gartenberg in
5
Jones v. Harris, emphasizing the candor of the adviser to the board as
the primary consideration in determining whether the adviser’s
6
compensation was lawful under the ICA. Based on its view that the
mutual fund markets are sufficiently competitive, the Seventh Circuit
held that absent extreme circumstances the only cause of action under
section 36(b) is for a failure of the adviser to make full disclosure. The
Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed the Seventh
Circuit decision and instead adopted the Gartenberg test with minor
7
adjustments. This short article will assess the likely impact of Jones
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John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School.
15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-35(b) (West 2009).
Id.
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 928.
Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 632.
See Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
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and evaluate the Supreme Court’s decision to exercise what would
commonly be called “judicial restraint” in its analysis.
8
Little has changed from the pre-Jones v. Harris legal environment.
True, section 36(b) cases will move through the courts a bit differently
from now on. Lower courts will not be able to dismiss cases solely on
the basis that a given fee is within industry norms and they will be
required to consider evidence comparing a fee with fees charged by
the same advisor to institutional funds or other institutional clients.
The Supreme Court’s refusal to rule out any particular set of arguably
relevant facts for purposes of section 36(b) analysis, or to establish
any bright-line rules establishing how plaintiffs might conclusively
9
demonstrate that a fee is excessive, means that fewer cases are likely
to be decided on a motion for summary judgment.
Nevertheless, federal trial court judges had enormous discretion
prior to Jones and continue to have enormous discretion to award
damages, or not, under section 36(b). Since the Supreme Court chose
to give little additional meaningful guidance to lower courts on what
10
factors to use, beyond slight modifications to the Gartenberg factors,
the probability of liability after trial will continue to depend on the
judge to which each case is assigned. If future cases are based not on
11
what the judge had for breakfast, then they will certainly be based
on the judge’s prior (and not necessarily known) beliefs about how
strong competitive market forces are in restraining fees. Since judge
assignments are not known prior to a case being filed, the outcome of
cases will be unpredictable, as in the past. Relatively few cases will be
12
brought, as in the past. Both plaintiffs—effectively controlled by

8. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
9. Id. at 1428.
10. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 930 (2d Cir. 1982) (providing
six factors to consider in weighing whether the mutual fund investment advisor breached a
fiduciary duty through charging excessive fees: nature and quality of services provided; the
profitability of the fund to the advisor; economies of scale operating as the fund grows larger;
fee structures of comparable funds; the independence and conscientiousness of trustees; and
fall-out benefits).
11. See Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judges’ Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 231, 235 n.16 (1990) (discussing Ronald Dworkin’s critique of legal realism, but
noting that the closest published phrase used by a realist, or a contemporary interlocutor of a
realist, was Roscoe Pound’s reference to “cadi” justice administered “at the city gate by the light
of nature tempered by the state of his digestion.” See Roscoe Pound, The Decadency of Equity,
5 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 21 (1905)).
12. With the assistance of lawyers and experts (both defense and plaintiff) involved in
pending section 36(b) cases, to whom I extend thanks, I have been gathering data on section
36(b) cases. So far, I have identified fewer than twenty discrete fund complexes that were
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plaintiff attorneys, who are averse to the risk of losing the time and
effort they invest bringing a case—and defendants—effectively
controlled by in-house attorneys and managers of fund advisory firms,
who are averse to the risk of a losing a high-profile case with potential
for both large money damages and reputational harm—will be likely
to settle cases before a trial on the merits.
I. THE IMMEDIATE BENEFICIARIES OF JONES
Thus, the primary beneficiaries post-Jones are lawyers. Plaintiff
attorneys will continue to bring fee cases and to extract fees from
settlements in some cases. Defense attorneys will still have to be paid
to defend all cases, good or bad, and fund and fund advisor corporate
counsel will have to be paid to advise and manage a time-intensive fee
review process in the shadow of potential fee litigation. Fund
directors, who are not typically paid by the hour but receive fixed fees,
will need to expend time and effort to go through a fee review and
approval process, with lengthy documentation, and will face the risk
of depositions, all without regard to whether the fees in question are
clearly competitive or not. In the end, of course, shareholders—fund
investors—have to pay for all of those attorney hours: plaintiffs’
attorney fees come out of settlements; defense litigator fees are paid
by advisors in the first instance, but ultimately by fund investors in the
form of higher fees; and defense corporate counsel are paid directly
by funds and indirectly through fund advisor fees.
II. WILL THE POST-JONES LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
SECTION 36(B) BENEFIT SHAREHOLDERS OF FUNDS?
Shareholders will only benefit from all of this lawyer expense if
cases are in fact brought against funds charging higher-thancompetitive fees and if the resulting settlements involve fee
reductions. Evidence from an ongoing research project suggests that
such cases will be rare. To date, litigants have sued, almost exclusively,
advisors charging fees that are below the median for funds of a similar
type, advising funds that are in the top quartile of assets under
targets of “pure” 36(b) litigation in the past ten years. “Pure” 36(b) section cases are those in
which 36(b) claims were based on excessive fees on their own, rather than piggy-backed on
claims involving allegations of advisory complicity in late trading, market timing, or other
practices not directly related to fees. I list the “pure” cases in Appendix A. (If readers are aware
of any additional cases, please contact me with the citations.) By contrast, in 2007, there were
over 600 advisory complexes.
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13

management. In other words, plaintiff attorneys have been targeting
advisors of relatively large funds charging relatively low fees. As
14
depicted in Figure 1, of the relatively few pure section 36(b) cases
brought since 2000 that I have been able to identify, all have primarily
targeted advisors in quadrants (1, 4) and (2, 4), where the first number
indicates the quartile for expenses (the x-axis on Figure 1), and the
second number indicates the quartile for fund size—and not against
funds being charged relatively high fees, which would be in quadrants
(3, y) or (4, y). Based on my analysis, not a single case has been
brought against an advisor to an equity fund ranked below the top
quartile in size.

Why would plaintiffs’ attorneys target those advisors, rather than
advisors charging relatively high fees? The answer is simple: the
highest fees tend to be charged to the smallest funds, and because the
prospective relief under 36(b) is based on the absolute size of excess

13. This is true of each of the cases listed in Appendix A, based on data on assets under
management and total expense ratios for over 600 advisors for equity funds from Simfund for
2007. Simfund is a database providing information on mutual funds, funds-of-funds, and ETFs.
14. See supra note 12 for a discussion of how I identify “pure” 36(b) cases.
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fees, rather than on their relative size. Thus, prospective damages are
greatest when the target is large. But wouldn’t a damage award be
most likely when the fees are relatively high? Not necessarily. A
damage award would be most likely if, but only if, courts consider
comparable fees in reaching liability determinations, –something that
16
17
Gartenberg and Jones permit, but a baseline on which both courts
cast some doubt.
Moreover, as noted above, the parties have powerful interests to
18
settle, and the vast majority of 36(b) cases settle. Even if settlements
are correlated with expected liability, settlements are likely to be
much more sensitive to differences in damage awards caused by
differences in fund size, and not as sensitive to differences in the
expected probability of liability caused by differences in relative fee
levels. This is because expected damage awards rise very quickly as
one moves from the smallest to the largest funds—indeed, the largest
funds are now much larger than the smallest funds. The variation in
expected return due to variation in fund size is not subject to
significant judicial discretion: fees are a fixed percentage of fund
assets, and legal fees are a relatively fixed fraction of fee overcharges.
By contrast, trial courts have enormous discretion in deciding whether
liability exists in 36(b) cases, and that discretion will be used
differently by different judges (based, among other things, on their
prior beliefs about how strong competition is as a restraining force on
fund fees). Since both Gartenberg and Jones questioned the
significance of fee comparisons—the expected liability for complaint
attacking a relatively high fee will often be only slightly higher than
the expected liability for attacking a relatively low fee.

15. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80(a)-35(b)(3) (West 2009).
16. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that
the fee charged by advisors is a factor to be considered, but not the “principal” factor).
17. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1426 (2010) (noting that the fees charged by
other advisors should not be the principal consideration, but that this does not absolutely
preclude their consideration).
18. Of the cases listed in Appendix A, 80 percent of those that had been resolved as of this
writing were settled. See also Mark S. Van Broek, The Demand Requirement In Investment
Company Act Shareholder Actions, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1500, 1528 n.158 (1983) (noting that, as
of 1982, most section 36(b) cases have settled).
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III. THE DOWNSIDE OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
Judicial restraint has long been touted as a virtue by political
19
conservatives who viewed the expansion of civil rights and civil
liberties under the Warren Court as turning courts into unelected
legislators. Chief Justice John Roberts, before joining the Supreme
Court, advocated judicial restraint, and was touted by conservatives as
20
a “model of judicial restraint.” More recently, political liberals have
21
rediscovered the virtues of judicial restraint, as the conservative
majority on the Supreme Court has radically rewritten whole sections
of Constitutional law in favor of political activists at the National
22
23
Rifle Association, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, companies
24
25
engaged in price-fixing, mass tortfeasors, and employers charged
26
with discrimination. All of these decisions were written or joined by
Chief Justice Roberts. Despite the evident activism of these decisions,
however, the Roberts Court is capable of restraining itself—as in
cases like Jones v. Harris—in technical cases that grab few headlines
and offer no talking points for political fundraisers.
19. See e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
69–100 (The Free Press 1990) (criticizing the Warren Court); ALEXANDER M.
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
16–23 (1962) (same); see also LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES LECTURES 66–75 (Harvard University Press 1958) (criticizing judicial restraint
broadly); MARK TUSHNET, THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL
PERSPECTIVE 38–42 (University Press of Virginia 1993) (characterizing the Warren Court as
political rather than legal).
20. Edward Whelan, Op-Ed, A Model of Judicial Restraint, Not Activism, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 6, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/sep/06/opinion/oe-whelan6.
21. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 225 (2004) (maintaining that the Rehnquist Court “carried the theory
of judicial power developed by its predecessors to its logical conclusion”).
22. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821–22 (2008) (striking down a
handgun law on Second Amendment grounds); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020,
3025 (2010) (same, and incorporating the Second Amendment into the Fourteenth
Amendment).
23. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (overturning
several precedents and utilizing the First Amendment to strike down a 50-year old federal
statute barring corporations and unions from making independent political expenditures in
federal elections).
24. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007)
(overturning a ninety-seven-year-old precedent to hold that vertical price-fixing schemes are not
per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
25. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007) (deeming a jury award of
damages designed to punish the defendant for harm to persons not before the court as a
“taking” of property without due process).
26. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007) (interpreting Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act to bar claims based on decisions made more than 180 days prior),
superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
OF THE LAW
BICKEL, THE
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Unfortunately, sometimes-judicial activism is precisely what a
statute needs. Sometimes, judicial “activism” is simply another name
for the conventional evolution of the law in a fashion familiar to all
lawyers from first-year common law courses—a process the most
legally conservative jurists (whether politically liberal or
conservative) would embrace. In enacting section 36(b), Congress
gave the federal courts an unappetizing job: to discern limits based on
a vaguely stated standard on compensation in what is clearly both a
conflicted but also competitive context. That job necessarily involves
exercise of judicial discretion. For an appellate court to attempt to put
some order on the chaos invited by the statutory standard is precisely
what courts have long attempted to do. Courts create order in an
iterative fashion by coupling decisions with written opinions,
explaining their reasoning, which become precedent to be
distinguished or followed based on further reasons, and so on. In
Jones v. Harris, the Court squashed the nascent effort by the Seventh
Circuit to begin this process—not by disagreeing with what the
Seventh Circuit had decided and announcing its own interpretative
reasoning, but by punting the entire shapeless mess of section 36(b)
back to the federal district courts. An apparent adherence to the “rule
of law”—rejecting a contestable interpretation of a statute—becomes
instead its very opposite, rejecting by implication any effort by the
federal circuit courts to organize or shape litigation under section
36(b).
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APPENDIX A LIST OF “PURE” SECTION 36(B) CASES
FILED SINCE JAN. 1, 2003

Case, Court
Hunt v. INVESCO Funds Group, Inc., S.D. Texas

Docket No.
04-2555

Baker v. Am. Century Inv. Mgmt., Inc., W.D. Missouri
04-4039
Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., D. Minnesota
04-4498
Reaves v. Federated Investors, Inc., W.D. Pennsylvania
05-201
Bennett v. Fid. Mgmt. & Research Co., D. Massachusetts
04-11651
Strigliabotti v. Franklin Resources, Inc., N.D. California
04-883
Sins v. Janus Capital Mgmt. LLC, D. Colorado
04-1647
Dumond v. Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., D. Massachusetts
04-11458
Amron v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisers Inc., S.D. New York
03-5896
Krueger v. Neuberger Berman Mgmt., Inc., S.D. New York
05-1316
Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., N.D. Illinois
04-8305
Vaughn v. Putnam Inv. Mgmt. LLC, D. Massachusetts
04-10988
Williams v. Waddell & Reed Inv. Mgmt. Co., D. Kansas
04-2561

